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of peat. The court found no substantive harm to the environment.
During the period that Michigan Peat operated without a permit
and during the permit application process, the permitting authorities
became fully aware of the activity. As soon as the permitting authority
notified Michigan Peat, it filed for, and diligently pursued, a permit.
In its 1994 permit application to the state of Michigan, Michigan Peat
presented a plan to return the mined areas to a wetland state
containing large bodies of open water. The process of reclamation
occurs when human intervention replaces one type of wetland with
another type of wetland that provides different functions and values
The EPA, however, disagreed and
than the original wetland.
requested restoration of the area to the extent practicable to the
original bog-like condition with the same functions and values. The
court held that disagreement with a regulatory demand was not an
avoidance of the permitting authorities.
The EPA, during the application process and fully aware of
Michigan Peat's activities, never advised Michigan Peat to close down,
never suggested modification in the peat mining activities, and never
sought a court order to close down Michigan Peat's operations. The
court found that because no governing agency attempted in any way to
alter or stop Michigan Peat's operations during the application process
Michigan Peat should not be penalized for its activities.
Julie S. Hanson
Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Great Spring Waters of
Am., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 853 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (holding the Water
Resources Development Act of 1986 does not imply, either explicitly or
implicitly, a private right of action to enjoin the diversion or
exportation of Great Lakes waters outside the Great Lakes basin).
Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, Grand Traverse Band
of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, and Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians ("Tribes") brought suit against Great Spring Waters of
America, Inc. ("GSWA") and John M. Engler, Governor of Michigan
("Engler"), in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan to enjoin GSWA from exporting waters from the
Sanctuary Springs ("Springs") in Mecosta County, Michigan under a
provision of the Water Resources Development Act ("WRDA"). GSWA
and Engler moved for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6). The court granted the dismissal,
concluding the WRDA provision disfavors a creation of a private cause
of action.
The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality ("MDEQ")
granted GSWA a license to pump 400 gallons of water per minute from
the Springs. GSWA maintained two wells on the Springs site, each
capable of pumping up to 200 gallons per minute. The Springs
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aquifer flowed into Osprey Lake, which, in turn, flowed into a stream
that flowed into the Little Muskegon River and Muskegon River
watersheds, both of which were tributaries of Lake Michigan. While
acknowledging that GSWA's parent company, the Perrier Group of
America, Inc., possessed title to real property in Mecosta County,
including water rights to the Springs, the Tribes asserted their rights as
riparians and users of Lake Michigan and its tributaries under the
1836 Treaty of Washington.
The Tribes sued under a provision of the WRDA that prevented
the diversion or exportation of water from any portion of the Great
Lakes within the United States, including any tributary within the
United States, for use outside the Great Lakes basin, unless all eight
Great Lakes Governors approve such activity. The Great Lakes states
include Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
New York, and Wisconsin under the WRDA. Based on depositions of
two GSWA employees, the Tribes alleged in their complaint that
GSWA intended to ship bottled water from the Springs, a "portion" of
the Great Lakes within the United States, for sale in Iowa and
Kentucky, areas "outside the Great Lakes basin." The Tribes claimed
GSWA's diversion and exportation of the Springs water required not
only Engler's approval under the WRDA, but the other seven Great
Lakes governors as well.
In the answer to the complaint, Engler admitted that GSWA's wells
would likely reduce the flow of waters into Lake Michigan. However,
he maintained that no "legal, practical or environmental significance"
resulted from the reduced flow, and the pumping activity would not
cause a "diversion" of the Great Lakes waters.
As GSWA moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the court construed the
factual matters set forth in the complaint in a light most favorable to
the plaintiffs. However, the case did not turn on the facts and
arguments set forth in the complaint and answer. Instead, the issue
before the court was whether the WRDA afforded the Tribes the right
to sue to enjoin a diversion or exportation of Great Lakes waters when
Engler unilaterally acted without the approval of the other seven
governors of the Great Lakes. The Tribes claimed that since the other
seven Great Lakes governors failed to act, the WRDA entitled them to
bring a private cause of action.
The court noted the WRDA contained no language that created an
express right of action on behalf of anyone to enforce this provision.
Furthermore, the legislative history offered no guidance on how to
enforce the provision. The court examined the precursors to the
WRDA, as well as subsequent amendments, in order to discern the
policy issues surrounding the legislation.
The court then applied a four-factor test to determine if an
implied private cause of action existed allowing the Tribes to defeat
the motion to dismiss. First, the Tribes must be members of a special
class the act intended to benefit. Second, the court must determine
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whether the legislature intended, expressly or implicitly, to create or
deny such a remedy. Third, the court must conclude if the remedy was
consistent with the statutory scheme.
Finally, the court must
determine if the subject of the suit was one traditionally relegated to
state law, making a private federal enforcement action inappropriate.
The court decided that the WRDA benefited the general public,
but did not allow for a special class of users, i.e., riparians or treatyholders, to assert additional privileges or benefits. The WRDA gave
the Great Lakes states governors the authority to make decisions
collectively to protect the water and enforce the prohibition against
diversion and exportation of the resource. In bolstering deference to
the Great Lakes governors decision making, the court noted that
allowing private suits could frustrate any uniform policies or goals
implemented by the governors concerning conservation issues.
Additionally, the court pointed out the lack of "private right of action"
language and concluded the exclusion of the language was deliberate,
considering such private suit action verbiage exists in a recent
provision of the WRDA.
Completing the analysis set out above, the court found that private
suits were inconsistent with the statutory scheme, again alluding to
deference to the governors. The court agreed with the Tribes that the
subject of the suit falls under a federal interest, as opposed to state.
However, the court disagreed that the compelling interests revolved
around regulating Indian affairs. Instead, the court categorized tribal
rights as peripheral, and emphasized interstate commerce issues
associated with the Great Lakes.
Additionally, the court noted three fact situations where the
current legislative scheme might prove inadequate. As this case
demonstrated, what is to be done if the governors fail to take any
action when diversion or exportation of the Great Lakes occurs? A
second potential problem was the lack of an explicit enforcement
mechanism for the governors to use in supervising a wayward
governor. The third cause for concern was the lack of Congressional
delegation of authority to an officer in the executive branch to
intervene if a governor chose to act in a manner that served his/her
interests, but stood in opposition to federal interests in Great Lakes
waters.
Melissa L. Gordon

Am. Littoral Soc'y v. EPA, 199 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D.N.J. 2002) (denying
summary judgment for conservation groups alleging arbitrary and
capricious decision making because the Environmental Protection
Agency could demonstrate good cause for each of its decisions).
American Littoral Society ("Littoral") brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the

